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This article examines how moral rights are treated in Australian publishing 
contracts, and whether this approach is consistent with the expectations of authors, 
journalists and academics. Although, in theory, moral rights cannot be sold or 
assigned in Australia, the apparent wide scope for exceptions raises questions of 
whether there is any real protection afforded to creators under the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth), notably in circumstances that relate to pressure on creators to accept 
contractual terms in order to get published. Additionally, Australian case law 
reflects some uncertainty about the traditionally accepted non-economic nature of 
moral rights. The article examines recent case law in this field, found in Meskenas, 
Perez and Corby, and considers the literature associated with development of moral 
rights in Australia. It then presents the findings of a two-part study of moral rights 
in Australia; first through the results of interviews with 176 Australian authors, 
journalists and academics, followed by an analysis of 20 publishing contracts. It 
concludes that — in some, but not all, instances — a combination of the exceptions 
allowed under the Act and practical exigencies have diluted the unique character 
of authors’ moral rights and have created an environment of uncertainty.  
I INTRODUCTION 
Whilst the Australian Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (‘Copyright Act’) protects the moral 
rights of authors of written work for the duration of their copyright, 1  it makes 
provision for authors to consent to derogatory treatment of their work and non-
attribution, as well as ‘reasonable’ infringement. The Copyright Act outlines some of 
the matters to be taken into account when determining whether treatment of a work 
was ‘reasonable in all of the circumstances’.2  
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1 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 190, 193, 195AC, 195AI. 
2 Ibid ss 195AR(1), 195AS(1). 
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Although moral rights cannot be sold or assigned under Australian law,3 the scope 
for exceptions and allowance for consent to derogatory treatment of work, raise the 
question whether there is sufficient protection for authors under the Copyright Act. 
This issue is particularly pertinent in circumstances where they may be subject to 
unreasonable contractual terms in publishing agreements. The question also arises 
whether there is any substantive difference between waiving moral rights and 
consenting to their infringement. Arguably, consent could be limited to specific 
situations or instances, whereas waiver may signify a blanket waiver of the author’s 
rights. However, in some instances where an assignment of copyright occurs,4 the 
omission of any mention of moral rights could be significant, especially where the 
contract allows for retention of certain rights, with no specific mention of moral 
rights. In such a case — where there is an assignment of copyright, and in countries 
where moral rights can be waived — it may be argued that by assigning the copyright 
and omitting any mention of moral rights, the author is effectively waiving moral 
rights by implication. These types of provisions create uncertainty for authors, 
especially in the international context in relation to online publishing. Additionally, 
there are some instances where publishing contracts effectively ascribe a financial 
value to moral rights, such as where the author receives financial reward for 
relinquishing moral rights.5  This raises the question: are moral rights truly non-
economic and how do these practices accord with the law and with authors’ 
expectations in relation to their moral rights?  
Internationally authors enjoy specific recognition of their moral rights under Article 
6bis of the Berne Convention, which provides that an author has a right not only to 
claim authorship, but also ‘to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification 
of [a work] or other derogatory action in relation to the said work which would be 
prejudicial to his honour or reputation’.6 The inclusion of moral rights provisions in 
Australian legislation showed a welcome move towards the Berne Convention’s legal 
recognition of authors’ personality rights.7 However, despite the inclusion of moral 
rights in the Copyright Act as a unique ‘non-economic right’, it is clear that the 
treatment of moral rights reflects the economic-utilitarian character of the Act itself.8 
                                                
3 Ibid s 195AN(3), which states: ‘… a moral right in respect of a work is not transmissible 
by assignment, by will, or by devolution by operation of law.’  
4 See, eg, Elsevier, Journal Publishing Agreement <https://www.elsevier.com/__data/ /pdf 
_file/0006/98619/Sample-P-copyright.pdf>. 
5 See discussion below in relation to publishing contracts, in particular: The Media 
Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Standard Freelance Contributor’s Contract 
<https://writerscontracts.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/alliancemodelcontract20090408.pdf>. 
6 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for signature 9 
September 1886, 828 UNTS 221 (entered into force 4 May 1896) art 6bis (‘Berne 
Convention’). 
7 By way of the 2000 amendments implemented by the Copyright Amendment (Moral 
Rights) Act 2000 (Cth). 
8 This is also borne out by the decision in Meskenas v ACP Publishing Pty Ltd (2006) 70 
IPR 172, discussed below. 
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Furthermore, authors are constrained in protecting their moral rights because of 
publishing practices and publishing contract terms. 
This article takes a three-part approach to examining this dichotomy. Following an 
analysis of the literature, including key cases of Meskenas v ACP Publishing Pty Ltd,9 
Perez v Fernandez10  and Corby v Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd,11  it presents empirical 
research to examine: first, how moral rights are perceived by authors, journalists and 
academics; and, second, how moral rights are dealt with in Australian publishing 
contracts and whether publishing practices are, in turn, compatible with the law and 
in line with authors’ expectations. Finally, it considers the complexities and 
implications of the current treatment of moral rights in publishing in the global 
environment.  
II MORAL RIGHTS IN THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT  
A Background 
Moral rights were only formally recognised in Australian legislation in 2000, when 
the Copyright Act was amended — by introduction of the Copyright Amendment 
(Moral Rights) Act 2000 (Cth) — to incorporate provisions relating to the moral rights 
of authors. Their introduction followed lengthy debate over many decades, including 
several government policy inquiries during the 1980s and 1990s.12 Rimmer describes 
the period as ‘an epic policy process’, typified by political prevarications, 
convoluted provisions, lobbying and compromise. 13  The decision was 
ultimately seen by some as a government capitulation, with the admission that 
existing laws were ‘fragmentary and incomplete’; not able to be accommodated by 
existing laws of defamation and passing off.14	
The Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 (Cth) protects the ‘moral right’ 
of authors as a right of attribution of authorship; or a right not to have authorship 
                                                
9 (2006) 70 IPR 172. 
10 (2012) 260 FLR 1. 
11 (2013) 297 ALR 761. 
12 Matthew Rimmer, ‘Moral Rights and Their Application in Australia’ (2004) 15 Federal 
Law Review 331 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/FedLRev/2004/15.html#fn3>; see 
also Attorney-General’s Department Copyright Law Review Committee, Report on Moral 
Rights (1988); Attorney-General’s Department, Proposed Moral Rights Legislation for 
Copyright Creators (1994); Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, 
Commonwealth Parliament, Copyright Amendment Bill 1997 (1997) (concerning the Bill 
that became the Copyright Amendment Act (No 1) 1997 (Cth). 
13 For further discussion see Matthew Rimmer, ‘Shine: Copyright Law and Film’ (2001) 12 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 129; Matthew Rimmer, ‘Crystal Palaces: Copyright 
Law and Public Architecture’ (2002) 14 Bond Law Review 320. 
14 Leanne Wiseman, ‘Moral Rights in the Australian Academy: Where to Now?’ (2005) 
28(1) UNSW Law Journal 98.  
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falsely attributed; or a right of integrity of authorship.15  In the case of Perez, 16 
outlined below, Federal Court Magistrate Driver FM advocated for the independent 
existence of moral rights from the bundle of ‘economic’ rights protected by copyright. 
He outlined how they were inalienable to the author, giving protection to the 
investment of the author’s personality in his or her creation, drawing jurisprudential 
force from civil law traditions and international copyright and human rights 
conventions to which Australia is a party. He cited the (then) Attorney-General’s 
Second Reading Speech in introducing the relevant amendments to the Copyright Act 
in 1999:  
… this bill is not just about fulfilling international obligations. More importantly, it 
is about acknowledging the great importance of respect for the integrity of creative 
endeavour. At its most basic, this bill is a recognition of the importance to Australian 
culture of literary, artistic, musical and dramatic works and of those who create 
them.17 
Thus, the inclusion of Part IX in the Copyright Act, dealing exclusively with moral 
rights, signified the legal recognition of Australian authors’ personality rights and 
reflected the philosophies of 19th and 20th century theorists.18 Its aim was, however, 
not only to protect the personality of authors, but also to provide incentives for 
creators to continue to create for the public benefit. It was evident that, historically, 
the recognition of moral rights in Australia was closely connected to economic 
incentives.19 Notionally, moral rights provisions protect the creator rather than the 
copyright holder. However, as previously pointed out by Adeney,20 the Australian 
system may be regarded as ‘a hybrid system with authorial moral rights grafted onto 
a framework that has developed to protect the economic interests, not of the author, 
but the copyright owner’. This approach was also taken in the earlier Australian Ergas 
Committee Report, which stated that ‘the general objective of the system of 
intellectual property law in Australia is utilitarian, and more specifically economic, 
rather than moral in character’.21 Further: 
… the Australian tradition in intellectual property law is more explicitly utilitarian: 
in the sense of seeking to maximize social welfare, rather than focusing on IP as 
having intrinsic value and hence merit.22  
                                                
15 Copyright Act s 189. 
16 Perez v Fernandez (2012) 260 FLR 1. 
17 Ibid 15. 
18 See, eg, Justin Hughes, ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ (1988) 77 Georgetown 
Law Journal 330. 
19 Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Review of Intellectual Property Legislation under the Competition Principles 
Agreement (2000) 33 (‘Ergas Committee Report’). 
20 Elizabeth Adeney, ‘Moral Rights and Substantiality’ (2002) 13(1) Australian Intellectual 
Property Journal 5, 10. 
21 Ergas Committee Report, above n 19, 33. 
22 Ibid 43. 
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According to Stokes, moral rights could be justified on economic and public policy 
grounds for the following reasons: consumer interest was served by establishing the 
authenticity of products and, further, the value of a product would be increased if it 
was shown to be original.23 Whilst particularly true in the field of art, this line of 
reasoning is applicable to all forms of creative endeavour, especially when viewed 
within the ambits of transformative capabilities. This also applies in academic 
writing, where, although there is generally no direct financial reward for authors, the 
value of writing and research is closely linked with the persona of the author. 
Most of the literature on moral rights has examined the concept from an international 
perspective24 or within a specific context, such as the digital treatment of moral 
rights.25 This article provides a new examination by bringing together case law, the 
perceptions of those using the law and the writing contracts that may or may not 
employ elements of the law. 
B Current Law 
As noted, under s 195AWA of the Copyright Act, there is no infringement of an 
author’s moral rights if the author has consented in writing to any acts or omissions 
relating to these rights, or if the infringement was ‘reasonable’. Such rights include 
the right to have the work attributed to the author, not to treat it in a derogatory 
manner, including not changing the work without the author’s consent.26  
International scholars have noted a distinction between economic and personal rights 
as being either dualist or monist. The dualist perspective justifies the unequal 
treatment of moral and economic privileges as corresponding to two different legal 
objectives: (a) the protection of the author as an individual by means of his work; and 
(b) the provision of economic profit for the author. In contrast, monist systems give 
similar priority to both rights based on the inseparable character of the elements 
coinciding in copyright.27 Accordingly, dualist countries (including France, Belgium, 
Brazil, Greece, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain) hold that moral rights are 
inalienable, cannot be waived and may be considered perpetual, while the economic 
privileges are limited in time. Monist countries (including Germany, Argentina, 
Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) consider moral 
                                                
23 Simon Stokes, Art and Copyright (Hart Publishing, 1st ed, 2001) 65. 
24 See, eg, Gerald Dworkin, ‘The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Common 
Law Countries’ (1994) 19 Columbia-VLA Journal of Law and Arts 229; Adeney, above n 
20. 
25 See, eg, Baseem M Melhem, Marah Maidi Al-Abweh and Haitham A Haloush, ‘Re-
Conceptualising Moral Rights in the Digital Era’ (2008) 72 Intellectual Property Forum 44; 
J Carlos Fernandez-Molina and Eduardo Peis, ‘The Moral Rights of Authors in the Age of 
Digital Information’ (2001) 52(2) Journal of the American Society for Information Science 
and Technology 109. 
26 Copyright Act ss 195AR(1), 195AS(1). 
27 Fernandez-Molina and Peis, above n 25, 112-13. 
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rights to be as long-lived as economic rights, and like economic rights, they too can 
be waived.28 
Most common law countries have adopted an approach that makes moral rights 
inalienable but waivable. 29  Dworkin’s analysis of moral rights in common law 
countries, published several years prior to their introduction in Australia, 30  and 
focusing closely on the United Kingdom (‘UK’), concluded that exceptions and 
qualifications to moral rights in the UK could be seen to ‘modify, some would say 
emasculate, moral rights in the light of business reality’.31 Others argued that this 
balance, which favours business over individual personal rights, undermined the 
essence of moral rights.32 As such, the adoption of moral rights in the UK has been 
described as ‘cynical’, ‘half-hearted’ and ‘lacking conviction’, attributed to 
legislators being ‘primarily concerned to preserve the interests of exploiter groups 
against moral rights encroachments, rather than to recognise and enforce authors’ 
interests. The resulting legislation reflects that ambivalence’.33  
Meanwhile, the digital environment, which has altered information processing, 
publishing and transmission globally, has added significant complications to moral 
rights of authors. Fernandez-Molina and Peis note how:  
agreement on appropriate legislation for the protection of authors’ moral rights in 
the context of the current international scenario, then, means resolving three 
separate conflicts: (1) authors versus publishers, (2) authors versus users, and (3) 
droit d’auteur versus copyright.34  
While representing separate conflicts, these conflicts also overlap, notably in the 
Australian context, which has seen only a handful of moral rights cases to date. Three 
cases have tested moral rights in Australia since their introduction into the Copyright 
Act in 2000. In each case, a separate element of moral rights was tested: false 
attribution in Meskenas; integrity and degradation of work in Perez; and attribution 
in Corby. Notably, in Meskenas and Perez, the Court took very different positions on 
the relationship between moral rights and economic rights, as outlined below.  
                                                
28 Ibid.  
29 Deming Liu, ‘The Artist Has Got Moral Rights and That Ain’t Bad’ (2011) 33(3) 
European Intellectual Property Review 169, 175. 
30 Dworkin, above n 24. 
31 Ibid 256. 
32 Liu, above n 29, 175. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Fernandez-Molina and Peis, above n 25, 114. 
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C Meskenas v ACP Publishing Pty Ltd 
Australia’s first case of moral rights found an artist successfully suing the publisher 
of Woman’s Day magazine for infringing his rights of attribution.35 Of note, the case 
also confirmed the Court’s connection between economic and moral rights. This was 
the first time an Australian court had considered the financial value of moral rights.36 
The case, which considered whether copyright and moral rights had been infringed 
in attributing a painting to the wrong artist, found copyright had not been infringed 
because the artist did not own the painting’s copyright but his moral rights had been 
infringed. In deciding the case, Magistrate Raphael opined: ‘I am of the view that the 
respondent cannot escape liability for its actions in infringing the moral right of the 
applicant not to falsely attribute the authorship of the painting on the ground 
submitted.’37 In determining damages he noted the lack of authority on which to 
determine quantum, reverting to an economic loss equivalency: ‘In my view the 
primary damages for the infringement of moral rights in this case should reflect those 
which I would have awarded if I had believed that there was an infringement of the 
applicant’s copyright.’38  
While the award of $1,100 was based on wrongful attribution, Magistrate Raphael 
awarded a further $8,000 to Mr Meskenas for aggravated damages, based on the 
conduct of the publisher in refusing to publish an apology despite repeated requests.39 
Because there was no commercial dealing, the moral rights breach was equated to a 
breach of copyright.40 One commentator noted: ‘It is not clear whether this is a 
universal principle, or whether different considerations apply in assessing these 
damages where there has been a commercial dealing.’41  
D Perez v Fernandez  
In contrast to Meskenas, this case was the first to consider the integrity of authorship 
and the right not to have work subjected to derogatory treatment.42 At issue were the 
moral rights and copyright infringement of internationally known rap/hip-hop artist 
Armando Perez, known as ‘Pitbull’, by Perth disk jockey and music promoter Jaime 
Fernandez. The case centred on how Fernandez had combined an ‘audio drop’ he had 
received from Perez with the words from Perez’s song ‘Bon Bon’, uploaded the 
                                                
35 Meskenas v ACP Publishing Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 172. In this case, a photograph of 
Princess Mary of Denmark standing in front of a portrait of the late heart surgeon Victor 
Chang, which had been painted by Mr Meskenas, was falsely attributed to another artist, 
Jiawai Shen, when published in Woman’s Day magazine.  
36 Michael Napthali, A Picture Tells a Thousand Dollars (2 August 2007) Communications 
Council <www.communicationscouncil.org.au/public/content/ViewCategory.aspx?id=748>. 
37 Meskenas v ACP Publishing Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 172, 187.  
38 Ibid 189. 
39 Ibid 190. 
40 Napthali, above n 36. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Perez v Fernandez (2012) 260 FLR 1.  
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altered ‘Bon Bon’ song to his website, streamed it and played it at nightclubs. Perez, 
as the author of ‘Bon Bon’, and two companies who owned the copyright in the sound 
recording of the song, brought an action against Fernandez in the Australian Federal 
Magistrates Court seeking damages and other remedies.43 
In his judgment of the case, Driver FM separated the moral rights from the copyright, 
citing Meskenas: 
In Meskenas, the Court ultimately took the view that the compensation awarded for 
moral rights infringement should reflect that which it would have awarded for 
copyright infringement. The applications submit that this approach would not be 
apposite here. In this case there are two distinct groups of applicants involved: Mr 
Perez sues on the basis of his moral rights; the second and third applications sue on 
the basis of their copyright. Were the conflation of copyright and moral rights 
damages in Meskenas to be applied here without appreciation of the underlying 
factual differences it would leave one class of applicant uncompensated at the 
expense of the other.44  
Driver FM said, however, he did not accept that Mr Perez had suffered any lasting 
damage and while his moral rights had been infringed, causing distress, an apology 
had been made by Fernandez, albeit grudgingly so. He awarded Perez $10,000 for the 
moral rights infringement.45 Compensatory damages to the copyright owners were 
considerably lower at $2,312 each, thus representing not only Australia’s first case 
which purposefully separated moral and economic rights, but in so doing, awarded a 
higher compensation for moral rights than for the copyright breach. 
E Corby v Allen & Unwin 
Corby46 further extended the moral rights law findings in Meskenas and Perez. The 
dispute centred on the use of photographs in Eamonn Duff’s book the Sins of the 
Father, published by Allen & Unwin. Members of the Corby family claimed 
copyright in five of the 37 photographs in the book had been infringed by Allen & 
Unwin, and that the moral right of attribution had been infringed in four of the 
photographs. Buchanan J found that the lack of attribution did not follow industry 
practice, as asserted by Allen & Unwin, and, in any case, the publisher had identified 
other photographers throughout the book. Buchanan J found the publisher had 
infringed the moral rights by non-attribution. In ordering damages for copyright 
infringement totalling almost $55,000, he noted that the ‘infringement of copyright 
must be taken into account in assessing damages for moral infringement’.47 It is also 
worth noting that Buchanan J said he was not satisfied that any of the applicants had: 
                                                
43 Melanie Bouton, Damages Awarded for Moral Rights Infringement (9 March 2012) 
Freehills <www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/-/media/Freehills/A09031221%2025.PDF>. 
44 Perez v Fernandez (2012) 260 FLR 1, 16–7. 
45 Ibid 19. 
46 Corby v Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd (2013) 297 ALR 761. 
47 Ibid 783. 
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suffered a loss resulting from lack of attribution, whether loss includes commercial 
loss or injury to feelings. There is no reason to conclude that any of the applicants 
would have wished their name to be published in connection with a photograph of 
which they were the author.48 
He added: 
I am prepared to make a declaration that the moral rights of attribution of each of 
the applicants has been infringed in the present case, even though the infringement 
seems to me to be more a question of form than substance.49  
Thus, whilst drawing a distinction between copyright and moral rights, he appeared 
to give precedence to copyright infringement over that of moral rights in assessing 
damages, finding no evidence of financial loss in relation to moral rights.  
It is interesting that these three cases each tested separate aspects of the moral rights 
provisions: Meskenas tested the right not to have work falsely attributed; Perez 
examined the right to maintain the integrity of a work; and Corby saw to the right of 
attribution. It is also worth noting that the two most recent cases (Perez in 2012 and 
Corby in 2013) both occurred after the following study in 2010 which sought to 
investigate the perceptions and knowledge of authors, journalists and academics (who 
also worked in the field of writing) in relation to moral rights. Thus, it is important to 
remember as we examine the findings below that, with the exception of Meskenas 
(which dealt with artists’ rather than authors’ moral rights), respondents did not have 
the Australian case law to base conclusions on and were largely drawing from either 
a theoretical knowledge of the field of moral rights, international case law, or 
international experience.  
III MORAL RIGHTS UNDER SCRUTINY: AUTHORS, 
JOURNALISTS AND ACADEMICS 
The article now moves to the empirical findings — drawn from interviews, a survey, 
and a content analysis — in an attempt to gain insights and a deeper understanding of 
the way moral rights are both perceived by users and incorporated into Australian 
publishing contracts. Findings from the interviews and survey of 176 Australian 
authors, academics and journalists (collectively referred to as ‘authors’) are examined 
first, followed by the results of the content analysis of 20 publishing contracts and 
guidelines from various sources. These collective results are, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first empirical findings about perceptions of moral rights and their 
implementation into contracts since they were introduced in Australia in 2000.  
                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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A Methodology 
The empirical study employed a triangulated approach, using qualitative and 
quantitative methods over a multi-phased time-frame. It was conducted during 
between 2010 and 2011, involving survey data obtained from a total of 176 authors, 
journalists and academics, using a combination of in-depth personal interviews 
undertaken face to face in Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne and the Gold Coast50 and a 
survey, administered via Survey Monkey, to members of the Australian Society of 
Authors. Participants in the research were selected by way of of ‘purposeful 
sampling’, as described by Patton. 51  Therefore, many of the participants were 
categorised as ‘elite interviewees’52 due to their leading and often influential roles 
within the Australian writing community. Interview responses included first-hand 
examples of how moral rights had affected them while the survey group provided a 
broader range of more generalised perceptions, based on the larger number of 
respondents.  
This phase of the research aimed to determine whether the views of Australian 
authors reflected an acknowledgement of the utilitarian objectives of Australian 
copyright law (including moral rights), and whether they regarded moral rights as 
separate from copyright. It was also intended to determine what the level of 
understanding and knowledge about moral rights was amongst the participants. These 
findings were then used as a foundation for examining a sample of Australian 
publishing contracts, to ascertain if such contracts reflected authors’ understanding 
of moral rights. A total of 20 Australian publishing contracts were examined, 
including journals, book publications and journalism contracts, to ascertain how 
moral rights are treated in practice, and whether their treatment is consistent with 
authors’ expectations and the law. These contracts were located via internet searches, 
between 2013 and 2015.  
B The Meaning and Value of Moral Rights 
Participants in the survey and face-to-face interviews were asked specific questions 
relating to their understanding of moral rights. First, what do moral rights mean to 
them as creators; and, second, did they feel that their moral rights were sufficiently 
protected under the Australian copyright structures?  
In the online survey, approximately 95 per cent of the 156 participants indicated that 
they viewed moral rights as important and approximately 63 per cent of these 
                                                
50 Francina Cantatore, Negotiating a Changing Landscape: Authors, Copyright and the 
Digital Evolution (PhD Thesis, Bond University, 2011) 131. For a full discussion of the 
methodology employed see 130–44. 
51 Michael Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (Sage Publications, 1990) 
169. See also R E Stake, ‘Qualitative Case Studies’ in Norman K Denzin and Yvonna 
Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research (Sage Publications, 3rd ed, 2005) 451. 
52 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (Sage 
Publications, 3rd ed, 1999). 
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respondents stated that it was ‘very important’.53 Not a single respondent viewed 
moral rights as ‘unimportant’ or ‘not important at all’.54 Thus it appeared that most 
of the respondents were strongly aware of the importance of moral rights. 
On the question of whether they thought their moral rights were sufficiently protected 
under the current copyright structure, the respondents appeared to be doubtful. Only 
approximately 30 per cent of participants agreed with the proposition ‘My moral 
rights are adequately protected under the current structure’, with over 40 per cent 
stating that they were undecided.55 Almost a third of participants disagreed that their 
moral rights were adequately protected. This result reflected an uncertainty in the 
sample group regarding the adequacy of protection of their moral rights afforded by 
the current copyright legislation and government structures. Moreover, although 
participants expressed an overwhelming bias in favour of the importance of moral 
rights, there appeared to be a substantial lack of knowledge about the level of 
protection afforded to them by current structures in respect of their moral rights.56  
The responses by interviewees varied from indifference to strong appreciation of 
moral rights, with some participants acknowledging the value of moral rights, not 
only as a concept reflecting personality rights but also as a specific right which 
resulted in an economic benefit. Although most of the interviewees were aware of the 
inclusion of moral rights in the legislation, one author admitted that he had no idea 
what moral rights were and another saw it as ‘just another form of copyright’.57 
Most authors recognised that moral rights gave authors the right to be identified as 
the creator of the work and to be able to determine how their work should be treated. 
One author, who was also a publisher, stated that it meant that ‘creators’ rights go 
beyond a fiscal matter and that they have a genuine say in how their work is treated’.58 
An academic participant emphasised the importance of the right to be identified as 
the author, especially where writing had been commissioned for a flat fee and then 
made available online as a value-adding tool by the publisher, with no further 
payments (to the author) attached to the writing.59 This view was echoed by another 
participant who stated further: ‘Moral rights mean a great deal to me. It is my right 
for my created works to be acknowledged as mine.’60 
A bestselling non-fiction author and academic proposed quite an extensive protection 
scheme, extending beyond the original work:  
                                                
53 Cantatore, above n 50, 159. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid 159–160. 
56 Ibid 159. 
57 Ibid 161. 
58 Ibid 160.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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As a professional author, I require the moral right to assert or disclaim my 
authorship over a work, and to object to any editing changes which may undermine 
my reputation. In my experience, this also extends to the meta-documents and meta-
processes which support the work, such as press releases, interview quotations, and 
even the types of third party companies which are permitted to use my books (or 
extracts therefrom) as promotional for their own products or services.61 
This viewpoint reflected the acknowledgement that moral rights not only entitled the 
author to assert authorship rights, but also to determine how the material was treated 
by external parties. It further recognised that without this right an author would lose 
the ability to control how his or her work was used.  
A bestselling fiction author regarded the value of moral rights as a tangible right to 
be asserted or alienated by the author at will. He described the meaning of moral 
rights to him as a creator as follows:  
It means that I can make some claims as to the integrity of the work, that people 
can’t come along and change my work and have my name attached to it, and make 
it something that is drastically dissimilar to the book that I had written in the first 
place. In a way, that changes its meaning or changes what I wanted to achieve by 
writing it. I think that it’s good that there is some notion paid to the integrity of the 
work that honours the intention of the author who created it.62 
He went on to elucidate by using the example of his book where international film 
rights were sold to an Italian filmmaker:  
When you sign off your film rights you have to sign away any moral rights over the 
film ... because in buying your film rights they reserve the right to do whatever they 
want with it in order to get it made. And they will change the characters and they 
will change the story and I’d much rather that was spelled out up front. I think they 
probably feel that in order to be able to make a film without that impediment, they 
need to know you’re not going to take action against them, saying, ‘but that’s not 
what my story was like’.63  
This author pointed out that, in that case, the producer not only changed the name of 
the characters and the name of the book, but the setting was changed from an 
Australian city in mid-summer to mid-winter in Italy’s north. He was not unhappy 
with the changes and had willingly relinquished his moral rights, observing: ‘There 
were times when I was thinking, why did you even pay me at all? But I was happy to 
take it. I accept that and I think it’s kind of good that contracts require that to be 
spelled out so that you know what you’re up for … I’ve even signed contracts that 
have had specific clauses saying that I have no right to complain publicly if I don’t 
like the end result.’ His comments, based on his own experience, illustrated the 
economic value that authors may attach to their moral rights when contemplating the 
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2016 MORAL RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 83 
83 
 
overseas assignment of their copyright, especially film rights, and the consequences 
of the alienation of such rights. In the context of this research this author was viewed 
as an ‘elite interviewee’, more aware of and concerned with moral rights, due to the 
wide distribution of his work and his first-hand involvement with moral rights in his 
contracts.64 
Some participants raised concerns about moral rights, for example: ‘My USA 
publisher changed the wording of one of my books without my permission’.65 This 
‘Americanisation’ of the language impacted on the Australian ‘flavour’ and culture 
represented in his writing. Whilst most respondents stated that it was impossible to 
protect their copyright online, very few favoured flexible licensing models such as 
the Creative Commons.66 
Only a small group of writers, who could be described as ‘industry experts’ by virtue 
of their extensive knowledge of publishing, had what might be considered a full, 
working knowledge of the scope of moral rights protection in Australia. They 
understood that moral rights not only entitled the author to assert authorship rights, 
but also to determine how the material is treated by external parties. On a 
philosophical level, their comments echoed Barthes’ viewpoint,67 which suggests that 
an author only remains the author for the time he maintains control over the work.  
What emerged from the research were inconsistencies in the ways authors, journalists 
and academics generally viewed moral rights. Though most appreciated the 
‘personality rights’ aspect of moral rights, some associated moral rights with 
economic benefits. Most concerning, however, was the lack of confidence and 
knowledge regarding moral rights protection under Australian law. It was evident that 
the effectiveness of Australian moral rights protections in practice merited further 
investigation. 
C Publishing Contracts and Moral Rights 
In the context of the literature and the research conducted above, the second part of 
the study examined how moral rights provisions are implemented in Australian 
publishing contracts. Further, how the treatment of moral rights in publishing 
contracts impact on authors, journalists and academics. As noted earlier, a sample of 
20 publishing contracts and publishing guidelines was taken from well-known 
Australian academic journals, magazine publishers and book publishers. The sample 
represents a ‘purposive sample’ of academic journal contracts published by 
universities and major publishers, a commercial publisher, and magazine and 
newspaper publishers. The findings are discussed below as they relate to relevant 
clauses dealing with copyright and moral rights provisions. In assembling the sample 
                                                
64 Ibid 161–2. 
65 Ibid 186. 
66 Ibid 238. Creative Commons recognises the author’s moral rights and provides licensing 
options pursuant to the provisions of the Copyright Act s 189. 
67 Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author (1977) 142. 
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access was obtained to online agreements and in this regard convenience was a factor 
in the methodology.68 
Of interest is the diversity of clauses and inconsistency with which moral rights are 
treated by different publications. Although some publications specifically recognise 
the author’s moral rights, others do not mention moral rights at all, and a further group 
require the author to consent to infringement of moral rights. There are also 
inconsistencies in the ways journals published by the same publisher treat moral 
rights. For example, the two Thomson Reuters journals cited as examples, the 
Australian Law Journal (‘ALJ’) and Australian Intellectual Property Journal 
(‘AIPJ’), deal with moral rights in different ways. The ALJ makes no mention of 
moral rights whilst the AIPJ recognises the author’s moral rights and both apply a 
wide discretion in favour of the publisher to modify the author’s work.69 Additionally, 
inconsistencies in the wording of the AIPJ clauses could create confusion for authors 
as to the scope of their consent to infringement of their moral rights, in view of a 
provision giving the publisher ‘absolute discretion’ to deal with the article.70 In the 
case of the ALJ, there is no reference to moral rights, and in addition there is provision 
for the assignment of ‘all rights under the agreement’ to the publisher.71 As the 
‘absolute discretion’ of the publisher again extends to modifications of the work, it 
may be understood that the publisher is asserting the ability to assign any moral rights 
related consent it may have under the agreement. Because moral rights are not 
specifically mentioned in this agreement, this assignment clause could potentially 
impact on the Copyright Act provision dealing with non-assignability of moral rights 
under the Act.72  Although the publisher may argue that the legislation does not 
prohibit the assignment of rights under the licence, but rather the moral rights 
themselves, to take such a view would militate against the spirit of the protection 
afforded to the author under the Act. The non-assignment proviso has not been tested 
in our courts to date, but the lack of clarity in these contract provisions can only lead 
to confusion and uncertainty for authors. 
Some agreements, although used in Australia for Australian authors, emanate from 
international publishers. An agreement from publisher Elsevier provides that authors 
assign copyright in their manuscript to the publisher throughout the world, for the full 
term of the copyright. It makes no mention of authors’ moral rights. Presumably these 
moral rights will not be part of the assignment in the Australian context, but given 
the diversity of ways in which moral rights are treated globally, it is unclear what the 
publisher envisaged with this clause, and whether they may perceive moral rights to 
                                                
68 Patton, above n 51, 182. 
69 AIPJ, Submission Requirements, Thomson Reuters <sites.thomsonreuters.com.au/ 
journals/files/2015/10/AIPJ.pdf>; ALJ, Submission Requirements, Thomson Reuters 
<sites.thomsonreuters.com.au/journals/files/2015/11/ALJ-Submission-requirements.pdf>. 
70 AIPJ, above n 69. 
71 ALJ, above n 69. 
72 Copyright Act s 195AN: ‘… a moral right in respect of a work is not transmissible by 
assignment, by will, or by devolution by operation of law.’ 
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be a part of the bargain. From a practical perspective, if the publisher infringes 
authors’ moral rights, it could be difficult for Australian authors to address extra-
territorial infringements of their rights, not only from a contractual perspective, but 
also due to the reciprocal protection provisions under the Berne Convention and the 
fact that, for example, in the US moral rights are not afforded to literary authors. 
Previously, similar problems could arise in Taylor & Francis (Routledge) agreements, 
which also have international scope. Although used in Australia, their previous 
agreement referred to the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) when 
acknowledging the author’s moral rights. That agreement gave the publisher 
‘absolute discretion’ to modify and adapt the work and provided for assignment of 
the copyright to the publisher. However, over the last year Taylor & Francis have 
updated its copyright provisions and currently an author has the option to either assign 
copyright to it or elect to retain copyright and grant it an exclusive licence to publish 
the work for the full term of the copyright. No specific mention is made of moral 
rights.73 
The University of New South Wales Law Journal (‘UNSW Law Journal’) contract 
also makes provision for ‘assignment of copyright in the work to the Journal once it 
has been formally accepted for publication. This entitles the Journal, amongst other 
things, to publish the submission in any format and allow third parties to do so on 
such terms as the Editor thinks fit’.74 The Melbourne University Law Review contract 
has similar provisions relating to copyright and requires assignment of copyright with 
no specific mention of moral rights,75 although it states that ‘the Editors normally 
consult the author (or authors) before making any major changes’, which appears to 
acknowledge the author’s moral rights. However, the use of the word ‘normally’ 
raises the possibility that major changes could be effected to the work without the 
author’s knowledge, implying a broad consent to change the work. This may fall 
within the scope of the legislative provisions as long as the work is not treated in a 
derogatory manner.76 The Monash University Law Review also requires all authors to 
assign the copyright in their work to Monash University, and makes no mention of 
moral rights on its website.77 
In a different approach, copyright of articles published in the University of 
Queensland Law Journal (‘UQLJ’) is vested jointly in the UQLJ and the 
                                                
73 See <http://authorservices.taylorandfrancis.com/copyright-and-you/>; <http://author 
services.taylor andfrancis.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/licence-to-publish.pdf>.  
74 See UNSW Law Journal, Author Agreement <www.unswlawjournal.unsw.edu.au 
/sites/default/ files/unswlj_author_agreement_2.pdf>. 
75 See Melbourne University Law Review, Publication Policy, <http://law.unimelb. 
edu.au/__data/assets/word_doc/0008/1586141/2014PublicationPolicy1.doc>. 
76 Copyright Act s 195AWA. 
77 See Monash University Law Review, Submitting an Article, <www.monash.edu 
/law/about-us/publications/monlr/submissions>. 
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contributor.78 The Sydney Law Review similarly states on its website that ‘copyright 
in articles published in the Sydney Law Review is vested in the Sydney Law 
Review and its contributors’.79 In both cases, no mention is made of moral rights 
under their guidelines, which may create uncertainty for authors as to how their moral 
rights will be treated. No sample agreements for these two journals were publicly 
available at the time of this article.  
Only eight of the journals and publishers examined provide for retention of copyright 
by the author, which is then subject to a variety of permissions. For example, the 
Queensland University of Technology Law Review (‘QUT Law Review’) provides 
for retention of copyright by the author, subject to the journal having right of first 
publication, with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution Licence that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of 
the work's authorship and initial publication in the QUT Law Review. 80  The 
Australian Indigenous Law Review and University of Tasmania Law Review similarly 
allow for retention of copyright, subject to a non-exclusive licence to publish the 
article, the latter also providing for publication by third parties.81 These approaches 
align with the Social Sciences Research Network (‘SSRN’) copyright provisions that 
allow for retention of copyright by the author and a non-exclusive, revocable licence 
to the publisher.82 The University of Western Australia Law Review briefly states on 
its website that copyright remains with the individual authors.83 Notably, none of 
these publications make a direct reference to moral rights. Most provide for the ability 
to adapt and modify the format of the work as necessary for publication; however, 
these modifications would be grammatical or typographical rather than substantive.  
It is interesting to note how the licence provisions vary as between journals and 
publishers. Whilst the five publications discussed above all require limited rights 
under their licences, three other journals and publishers, discussed below, although 
allowing for the retention of copyright by the author, require a far broader licence. 
Both the Adelaide Law Review and Griffith Law Review contracts require authors to 
                                                
78 See University of Queensland Law Journal, Submissions, <http://www. law.uq.edu 
.au/uqlj-submissions>. 
79 See Sydney Law Review, Information for Authors (9 October 2015) <sydney.edu.au/law/ 
slr/guides.shtml>. 
80 See Queensland University of Technology Law Review, Submissions, <https://lr.law.qut. 
edu.au /about/submissions#authorGuidelines>. 
81 See Indigenous Law Centre UNSW, Policy on Publication (2012) Australian Indigenous 
Law Review <www.ilc.unsw.edu.au/sites/ilc.unsw.edu.au/files/AILR%20Policy% 
20on%20Publication %20new.pdf>; University of Tasmania Law Review, Submission and 
Publication Agreement, University of Tasmania <www.utas.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file 
/0006/88899/Sub_Pub_Agree_ UTLR1.pdf>. 
82 See Social Science Research Network, Frequently Asked Questions. <ssrn.com/update/ 
general /ssrn_faq.html#ssrn_copyright>. 
83 See UWA Law Review, Author Guidelines <www.law.uwa.edu.au/uwalr/authors>. No 
sample contract was publicly available and the scope of the licence to the publisher was 
unclear. 
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agree to a ‘perpetual, irrevocable, royalty free, world-wide licence’.84  While the 
Adelaide Law Review contract does not mention moral rights, the Griffith Law Review 
contract requires a broad consent to infringe authors’ moral rights (except for 
attribution rights). It states: 
The University will attribute to you authorship of the article. However, you 
acknowledge and agree that in giving your consent to publish, you also give consent 
to the University to infringe your moral rights (other than the attribution of 
authorship) as set out under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). You acknowledge and 
agree that the consent provided by you under this clause is a genuine consent given 
without duress or undue influence.85 
An unidentified mainstream book publisher also allows for copyright to remain with 
the author, subject to a ‘world-wide exclusive licence’ for the term of the copyright 
to publish the material.86 No specific mention is made of moral rights, except to state 
that the author’s name ‘shall appear in the Work as author’, thereby acknowledging 
the author’s right of attribution.87 
In relation to magazine publishers, Pacific Magazines provide for assigning ‘to the 
Publisher all present and future rights (including copyright) subsisting in the Material 
anywhere in the world (including any renewals or extensions to such rights)’.88 In 
addition to this broad licence, it also requires consent to ‘modify’ the material and, 
although the provision is broad, it acknowledges that modifications should not be 
prejudicial to author’s reputation.89 
                                                
84 Adelaide Law Review, Author Agreement <https://www.adelaide.edu.au/press 
/journals/law-review/submissions/alr-author-agreement.pdf>; Griffith Law Review, Policy, 
Submission Requirements and Style Guide, Griffith University https://www.griffith.edu 
.au/criminology-law/griffith-law-review/information-for-contributors. The Griffith Law 
Review Agreement to Publish (2007) was the latest version available to the authors at the 
time of this article. In contrast to the agreement, the website instead states: “Copyright in the 
title and content of the Journal is vested in Griffith University” and does not allow the 
author to retain copyright. 
85 Griffith Law Review, above n 84. 
86 Whilst this publisher is unidentified in this article, this type of clause has become 
commonly used by many commercial publishers internationally: see Cantatore, above n 50, 
208.  
87 Ibid.  
88 See Writer’s Contracts, Pacific Magazines: July 2010 Version <writerscontracts.com/the-
contracts/pacific-publications-july-2010-version/> cl 5. 
89 Ibid. 
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Fairfax publishers require authors and journalists to waive their moral rights in their 
work.90 Similarly, The Big Issue requires a broad consent in dealing with authors’ 
moral rights, stating: 
By submitting your material you agree that at any time we may, or we may authorise 
third parties to, publish, reproduce, modify and edit your material for the purpose 
of publication in The Big Issue (in hard copy, on our website or in any other 
medium) … You consent to our use of your material in this manner even if such use 
would otherwise infringe your moral rights.91 
In this case the consent required from the contributor is so wide as to constitute an 
effective waiver of the author’s moral rights. These waivers imply that publishers are 
able to make any changes or alterations to material they deem fit, change any by-lines 
or titles, and omit attribution to the author. In contract law generally, waiver means 
the unilateral abandonment of a right or claim. Thus one party may waive a term of 
the contract and can no longer effectively assert that right and demand its 
performance. 92 
From a brief examination of these contracts, it is evident that there are obvious 
discrepancies in the ways in which copyright is treated (for example, ranging from 
total assignment to a variety of licences); and, specifically in the context of this 
article, how moral rights are treated. Significantly, in most contracts, moral rights are 
not specifically mentioned, and if they are, acknowledgement appears to be limited 
to attribution. It is also apparent that moral rights are sometimes regarded as part and 
parcel of copyright. Although some publishers require an outright waiver of moral 
rights, none of the academic journals have this requirement, apart from Griffith Law 
Journal that acknowledges attribution of authorship.  
Finally, a brief comparison of the contract used by the Australian Society of Authors 
(‘ASA contract’) (written for authors) and an example of a standard industry 
publishing contract (‘standard contract’) — used by the unidentified mainstream 
book publisher mentioned above — shows significant differences in how moral rights 
are treated. A comparison indicates that the ASA contract includes a moral rights 
clause that deals with moral rights: 
MORAL RIGHTS 
(a) The Author asserts his/her moral rights in relation to the Work. 
(b) The Publisher must identify the Author in a prominent manner by including the 
Author’s name, or any other identification of the Author as reasonably requested by 
                                                
90 See Writer’s Contracts, Fairfax – Analysis <writerscontracts.com/analysing-the-
contracts/fairfax-analysis/>. Clause 6 of the Fairfax agreement requires contributors to 
waive their moral rights.  
91 The Big Issue, Contributor Guidelines <www.thebigissue.org.au/contribute>. 
92 McLachlan v Ryan (1987) 4 BCL 155. 
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the Author, in a reasonably prominent position on the cover (and dust jacket where 
applicable), spine and internal title page, and in all appropriate publicity material. 
(c) The Publisher must ensure that any permitted licensees and assignees of the 
Publisher:  
(i) Respect the Author’s moral rights in relation to the Work; and  
(ii) In particular, not do or omit to do anything which would amount to a derogatory  
treatment of the Work …93 
The ASA contract also refers to alterations to the work, for example, specifically 
providing that no alterations be made to the title of the work without the author’s 
consent.94 In contrast, the standard contract provides that, although the publisher 
agrees to consult with the author on the title, cover text, biographical note and cover 
design, the publisher reserves the right to make the final decision on all such matters. 
This means that the author, in signing the contract, is effectively consenting to the 
possible act of an involuntary title change, which may indicate a waiver of his/her 
moral rights.  
An initial comparison of a standard Fairfax contract and a contract from the Media 
Entertainment and Arts Alliance (‘MEAA’) shows similar disparities.95 The MEAA 
contract protects the author’s moral rights by stating: ‘All copyright and other 
intellectual property rights in the material, including rights to publish, reproduce and 
communicate to the public, to subsequent publication or communication, and all other 
rights whatsoever belong to the contributor.’ In contrast, clause 6 of the Fairfax 
contract states:  
You waive Your moral rights (as set out in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)) in relation 
to all Fairfax Work and give Fairfax Your consent to do (or omit to do) anything 
that might otherwise infringe Your moral rights, such that Fairfax may reproduce 
and deal with all Fairfax Work free from any impediment. 
However, the MEAA contract also includes the following section, which effectively 
equates the waiving of moral rights with economic compensation. It notes (emphasis 
added): 
The company agrees to acknowledge contributor’s moral rights in all media:  
                                                
93 Australian Society of Authors, ASA Contract <https://www.asauthors.org /contracts-
papers/model-publishing-agreement-template>. 
94 Ibid, stating specifically: ‘(a) No alterations will be made to the title of the Work without 
the Author/Owner’s consent.’ 
95 Fairfax Standard Contributors’ Agreement, Crikey <blogs.crikey.com.au/contentmakers 
/fairfax-standard-contributors-agreement/>; The Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance, see 
above n 5. 
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(a) with a credit/byline; 
(b) and agrees that it will not to be subject to derogatory treatment. If the company 
desires to publish or broadcast the material without a credit line, the company 
agrees to pay the contributor an additional fee of 100% of the fees agreed. 
This doubling of payment thus confirms some of our earlier findings that conflate the 
economic value of copyright with moral rights and indicate that it is ultimately taken 
out of the hands of the creator, and placed within the discretion of the publisher or 
broadcaster. 
IV ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
In answering the question as to whether moral rights live up to their intended scope 
of preserving personality rights of authors under Australian law, and drawing from 
the discussion above, the answer is far from unequivocal. From the perspective of 
authors and journalists, the inconsistent treatment of moral rights may raise 
uncertainty about the value and effectiveness of the moral rights provisions in the 
Copyright Act. Our findings point to several key areas which are either inconsistent 
with authors’ views, confirm their concerns, or, in cases where some respondents 
were unclear, shed light on the publishing environment as it pertains to moral rights. 
The key areas can be categorised as follows: economic nature; international contexts; 
author-publisher power differential; and the internet as a fundamental change agent. 
Economic nature: While economic copyright and moral rights appear to represent a 
fundamental distinction, early case law, as found in Meskenas, and the wording of the 
contracts under review confirm Adeney’s notion of hybridity and the principal thrust 
of the Ergas Committee Report. The primary object of the law in protecting the 
economic rights of the copyright owner, rather than the moral rights of the author, is 
patently illustrated in the treatment of moral rights in commercial publishing 
contracts such as the standard industry publishing contract and the standard Fairfax 
contract for freelance journalists. Whilst falling short of ‘assignment’ of moral rights 
— and thus operating within the ambits of the law — commercial publishers, through 
their economic power, essentially force authors and journalists to consent to extensive 
infringements of their moral rights. These broad forms of consent essentially amount 
to a waiver of moral rights, and, it could be argued, are broader than those permitted 
under the Act, specifically as consent provisions in relation to non-films require the 
consent to be ‘in relation to specified acts or omissions, or specified classes or types 
of acts or omissions’.96  Where academic journals implement similar practices, a 
parallel argument can be made, the ‘publish or perish’ environment of academic 
endeavour demands that academics accept publishers’ terms in order to publish their 
work, even if their moral rights are infringed in the process. This includes the MEAA 
contract that allows for non-attribution at the discretion of the publisher or 
broadcaster in lieu of financial compensation. 
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International publishers: The international publishing environment is clearly a 
complicating factor for authors as moral rights have been inconsistently adopted and 
interpreted. Despite the protective provisions of Art 6bis of the Berne Convention, 
there are inconsistencies in the way moral rights are treated in the international 
context. Considering the global dissemination of works in the digital environment, it 
cannot be assumed that authors’ moral rights will receive the same treatment in all 
jurisdictions. This includes some international publishers not observing the moral 
rights legislative provisions operating within Australia, such as Taylor & Francis. 
While there remains some uncertainty when publishing within Australia, the situation 
is increasingly open when publishing in other jurisdictions. 
Author–publisher power differential: The contracts examined indicate not only an 
inconsistent publishing environment for authors when publishing (in Australia and 
elsewhere) but a distinct lack of negotiating power. This may prevent authors from 
asserting their moral rights where the contract provides for waiver, or may imply a 
waiver by omission of moral rights and full assignment of copyright (for example, in 
the United States the lack of a provision for moral rights in the Copyright Act 
presumes a waiver of the rights). At the same time, the ‘publish or perish’ 
environment for academics and the ever-competitive environment for authors, puts 
them at a disadvantage. At the same time, although journalists can earn money from 
their publications by waiving their rights, they lose the option of asserting their moral 
rights. This is highlighted when comparing the ASA contract and the standard 
industry contract used by a mainstream publisher. In reality commercial publishers 
hold the power to enforce terms that favour themselves,97 as illustrated in the MEAA 
contract.  
Internet: It has become evident that, although authors’ moral rights are protected 
under the Copyright Act,98 the internet has widened the scope for infringement of 
these rights through unlawful transformation and appropriation. Authors seem unable 
to deal adequately with such violations. The internet’s strong user-focus presents a 
dilemma for authors in trying to address breaches of their moral rights and copyright 
generally. As such, these rights remain firmly subject to economic–utilitarian 
considerations and a general perception that electronic material should be freely 
accessible in ‘the new public sphere’.99 It could be argued that there is a (sometimes 
extreme) user-focus in electronic copyright, which leans heavily in favour of the 
consumer, often to the detriment of the content creator.  
                                                
97 For a discussion of the power balance between authors and publishers, see Francina 
Cantatore, ‘The Power Balance Revisited: Authors, Publishers and Copyright in the Digital 
Sphere’ (2013) 6(2) Creative Industries Journal 89. 
98 Copyright Act s 189. 
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In summary, the moral rights landscape in Australia may be described as both 
unpredictable and somewhat unsympathetic for authors. It is evident that broad 
consent provisions, combined with the bargaining power of publishers, may 
effectively neutralise authors’ moral rights. This is consistent with arguments raised 
during the debate period, prior to enactment in 2000. While case law provides 
precedents of acknowledgements of moral rights based on attribution and integrity, 
publishing agreements analysed for this study indicate that contracts and agreements 
are oriented more toward publisher rights than authors when considering the moral 
rights of the author. The degree of inconsistency and the limited testing of this 
relatively new law in Australia mean it should come as no surprise that authors are 
often unaware or confused about their moral rights, as indicated in this study. At the 
same time, it appears likely that, as this field of the law evolves, both within Australia 
and internationally, authors will continue to publish, either without control of their 
moral rights or under pressure to waive them substantially. 
 
